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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are the manager of a business. Two employees knock 
on your office door and claim that their religion requires them to have sex 
with as many coworkers as possible.1 Another employee informs you that 
she will receive the “Mark of the Beast” if she engages in a routine hand 
scan to enter the workplace.2 A fourth employee, your truck driver, claims 
that she must use a hallucinogenic drug while driving because of her 
religious observances.3 Such is the strange interaction of employees and 
religion in the workplace.4 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”) imposes an affirmative duty on employers to accommodate 
employees’ religious beliefs and practices,5 but the unclear definition of 
religion leaves courts grappling with the question of which religious 
beliefs or practices are deserving of Title VII protection.6 Protection of 
religious beliefs in the workplace requires a delicate balance because the 
involved parties have distinct interests and needs—employees want to 
practice their religion freely, employers seek to run their businesses 
autonomously, and courts examine religious beliefs cautiously.7  
Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of employees’ sincerely 
held religious beliefs, observances, and practices,8 unless accommodation 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2019, by ANNA E. REED. 
 1. McCrory v. Rapides Reg’l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 979 (W.D. La. 
1986), aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 2. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 
131, 136–38 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018). 
 3. Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 4. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979; Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 136–38; 
Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1483. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012); EEOC Compliance Manual: Religious 
Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 22, 2008), https:// 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#_Toc203359486 [https://perma.cc/XQ 
A8-ETTJ] [hereinafter Compliance Manual]. The employer’s duty to accommodate 
usually entails making an exception from, or adjustment to, a work or application 
requirement to allow the employee or applicant to practice her religion. Compliance 
Manual, supra. Accommodation requests often relate to work schedules, dress and 
grooming, or religious expression or practice while at work. Id. 
 6. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979; Lambert v. Condor Mfg., Inc., 768 F. 
Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 136–38; 
Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1483; Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015). 
 7. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Tagore 
v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 8. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
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would impose an undue hardship9 on the employer’s business operations.10 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) defines 
religious practice as including “moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right 
and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional 
religious views.”11 The definition of religion, in practice, is broad and 
problematic.12 Rather than redefine “religion” and draw a line too broadly 
or narrowly,13 this Comment proposes that a court examining a Title VII 
religious discrimination issue should heighten its examination in the 
sincerity prong of the analysis.14 In so doing, a court should employ a 
greater level of scrutiny into the sincerity of each employee’s particular 
belief on a case-by-case basis to determine if the employee sincerely holds 
the belief.15  
                                                                                                             
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining “religion” to include “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” unless employer can show 
that accommodation of employee’s religion would impose an “undue hardship on 
the . . . employer’s business”). 
 10. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; see also Compliance Manual, supra note 5; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2(a); Susannah P. Mroz, True Believers?: Problems of Definition in Title 
VII Religious Discrimination Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 145, 151 (2005). 
 11. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
 12. Bryan M. Likins, Determining the Appropriate Definition of Religion and 
Obligation to Accommodate the Religious Employee Under Title VII: A 
Comparison of Religious Discrimination Protection in the United States and 
United Kingdom, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 115 (2011) (“Determining 
Title VII’s definition of religion is the problem underlying many religious 
discrimination cases brought under Title VII. Deriving an adequate solution to 
this complex inquiry is a daunting task.”); Mroz, supra note 10 (“Although the 
courts have developed sophisticated rubrics to analyze each of the causes of 
action, the definition of the ‘religion’ that is to be protected remains murky.”); 
Major Christopher D. Jones, Redefining “Religious Beliefs” Under Title VII: The 
Conscience As the Gateway to Protection, 72 A.F. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (“The word 
‘religion’ applies equally to Title VII as it does in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution (‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’) and the laws concerning 
conscientious objectors.”). 
 13. Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion 
Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other 
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and 
Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 149 (2007). 
 14. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), 
aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 
86 (1944); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 15. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. 
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First, the court should determine if the observance or practice 
stemming from the employee’s belief imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer.16 If the employee’s religious practice causes an undue hardship, 
an employer need not accommodate the practice, and thus, the court will 
dismiss the claim.17 If the court finds that the practice does not impose an 
undue hardship, the court may proceed to the second phase of the analysis: 
whether the belief is sincerely held.18 To make a sincerity determination, 
the court should conduct a fact-intensive inquiry to determine the 
employee’s good faith in the expression of her religious belief.19 If the 
employee’s belief is not sincerely held, the court will dismiss the claim.20 
If the court finds that the employee’s belief is sincere and does not cause 
an undue hardship, the court will turn to the third and most difficult 
inquiry: whether the belief, observance, or practice qualifies as religious 
within the meaning of Title VII.21 In this final phase of inquiry, a court 
must determine if the party holds the belief with the strength of traditional 
religious convictions or in a “parallel position” to an orthodox belief in 
God.22 Such an inquiry presents a court with the constitutionally 
challenging task of determining which beliefs qualify as “religion,” a duty 
that a proper sincerity analysis limits.23 A heightened sincerity analysis 
further precludes a court from delving into the realm of scriptural 
interpretation.24 This Comment advocates that courts strike an effective 
balance by conducting a heightened sincerity analysis that: (1) ensures the 
protection of an employee’s sincerely held beliefs;25 (2) safeguards an 
employer from accommodating merely fraudulent, personal, or secular 
beliefs;26 and (3) prevents a court from crossing its own boundary into 
determining verity of beliefs.27  
                                                                                                             
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
 19. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. 
 20. See Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 21. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
 22. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66; Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 
(9th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 23. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66; Welsh, 404 F.2d at 1081. 
 24. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); 
Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Tagore v. 
United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 25. Davis, 765 F.3d at 497–98. 
 26. Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 482. 
 27. Id. at 481; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Patrick v. 
LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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Part I of this Comment discusses the First Amendment’s protection of 
religion and explores legislation that hinges upon religion. Part I then 
addresses Title VII’s protection against religious discrimination in the 
workplace and the difficulty in defining religion. Part II examines the 
hardship inherent in the protection of religious beliefs pursuant to Title VII 
through the lens of United States Employment Commission v. Consol 
Energy, Inc. and McCrory v. Rapides Regional Medical Center. Part III of 
this Comment explains the manner in which the court may conduct an 
accurate sincerity analysis and applies the analysis to Consol Energy, Inc. 
and McCrory. Finally, this Comment concludes by explaining the benefits 
of a proper sincerity analysis to the court, the employer, and the employee. 
I. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: PROTECTED IN THE WORKPLACE? 
The Supreme Court has grappled with what constitutes religion and 
has ultimately protected non-religious beliefs held by one either with the 
strength of traditional religious convictions or in a “parallel position” to 
an orthodox belief in God.28 Thus, courts could protect a wide array of 
beliefs, and the definition of religion is left ambiguous and problematic.29 
For example, courts have considered white supremacist ideals to be 
“religious belief[s],”30 and commentators have noted that veganism could 
trigger Title VII protection as well.31 In another instance, a plaintiff 
claimed that ingestion of “Kozy Kitten Cat Food” was a personal religious 
creed, but the court rejected the creed.32 Many religious beliefs may be 
worthy of accommodation, in part because the protection of religion is 
enshrined in the United States Constitution and is therefore culturally 
significant.33  
                                                                                                             
 28. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66; Welsh, 404 F.2d at 1081. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). Title VII itself broadly defines “religion” to 
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Id. 
See sources cited supra note 12. 
 30. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 
2002); see also Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat 
Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 753 (2004). 
 31. Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the 
Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 
404 (2005). 
 32. Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d without opinion, 
589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 33. James M. Donovan, God Is As God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the 
Definition of “Religion”, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 26 (1995); Usman, supra 
note 13 (noting that the First Amendment was drafted and ratified after a period 
characterized by a lack of religious liberty in the American colonies, highlighting 
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A. From the First Amendment to Today’s Legislation: The Problematic 
Definition of Religion 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .”34 The Constitution, however, leaves “religion” 
undefined.35 The Supreme Court acknowledged the lack of definition in an 
1878 case and turned to history to inform its interpretation of “religion.”36 
The Supreme Court quoted Thomas Jefferson who, upon learning that a 
clause respecting the freedom of religion would be added into the 
Constitution, stated: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for 
his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the 
government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between 
church and State.37 
The Court acknowledged that Jefferson was an advocate for a religious 
freedom provision and thus accepted Jefferson’s statement as “almost as 
an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus 
secured.”38 Accordingly, the court has afforded the freedom of religion 
great importance since its inception, exacerbating the difficulty courts face 
in applying religion-based legislation today.39 
Scholars, legal commentators, and courts have struggled to define 
religion as a component of legislation and regulation.40 Examples of 
                                                                                                             
its present importance). Additionally, “[i]n the mother country during the 
seventeenth century while British colonization of America was beginning, 
religious intolerance and oppression was omni-present.” Id. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35. Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (“The 
word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, 
therefore, to ascertain its meaning.”). 
 36. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162–64. 
 37. Id. at 164. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; Usman, supra note 13. 
 40. Usman, supra note 13. 
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legislation and regulations with a religious component include Title VII,41 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),42 and military 
regulations.43 RFRA and some military regulations are notably similar to 
Title VII as all require beliefs to be “sincere” to be protected.44 RFRA 
prohibits the federal government from “taking any action that substantially 
burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least 
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”45 Under 
                                                                                                             
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned 
discrimination in places of employment, education, and public accommodation. 
As a result, parks, restaurants, sports arenas, hotels, and theaters were open to all, 
regardless of the skin color. The Department of Education was further given 
authority to aid in the desegregation of schools. Finally, employers and labor 
unions were prohibited from discriminating against employees based on race, 
religion, gender, or national origin. Id. See also Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement 
on 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/cra50 
th/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/AC7M-FLY3]. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
comprehensive legislation enacted to ensure justice for all after decades of 
resistance to discrimination and segregation. See also The Civil Rights Act of 
1964: A Long Struggle For Freedom, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ 
civil-rights-act/civil-rights-act-of-1964.html [https://perma.cc/9UFC-MDCL] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2019) (explaining how President Johnson made the Civil Rights bill 
his first priority after President Kennedy’s death); see also Civil Rights Act, 
HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act [https: 
//perma.cc/G8BV-LEUR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). President Johnson had one 
goal in mind: for the Eighty-Eighth Congress to be remembered “as the session 
which did more for civil rights than the last hundred sessions combined.” Id. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4; see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014). In City of Boerne v. Flores, the United States 
Supreme Court held that RFRA was not a proper exercise of Congress’s 
enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal-state balance. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 508 (1997). Boerne, however, declared RFRA “unconstitutional only 
insofar as the Act applies to state and local governments. Nothing in Boerne 
requires courts to treat RFRA as unconstitutional as applied to the actions of 
federal government agencies and instrumentalities.” Rodney A. Smolla, 
Congress’s power to enact the act—Congress’s reliance on § 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment—The continued vitality of RFRA as applied to federal laws, 1 FED. 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 5:30 (3d ed.). 
 43. 32 C.F.R. § 75.3 (eliminated in 2007); see 72 Fed. Reg. 33677-01 (2007). 
 44. 32 C.F.R. § 75.3 (eliminated in 2007); see 72 Fed. Reg. 33677-01 (2007); 
42 U.S.C. § 2000c–2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 45. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
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RFRA, protection of “exercise of religion” only safeguards beliefs that one 
holds sincerely and are rooted in religion.46 Similarly, military regulation 
permits the discharge of objectors whose anti-war beliefs are “sincere and 
deeply held.”47  
Under Title VII, RFRA, and military regulations, the definition of 
religion is broad and imprecise.48 The Supreme Court has recognized this 
difficulty, stating: “The determination of what is ‘religious’ belief or 
practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.”49 Redefining 
religion, however, inevitably causes courts to draw a line establishing a 
definition of religion that is either too narrow or too broad.50 If Congress or 
the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of religion, courts could exclude 
minority religions and non-traditional faiths, stifling the natural progression 
of religious beliefs.51 Bias of the definers may color the definition of 
religion, as life experiences and cultural and religious perspectives may 
cause the definer to exclude other perspectives.52 The Supreme Court 
described the struggle to delineate religious practices, stating: “‘Religious 
experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to 
others.’ Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs 
because they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’”53 It is common for a 
person to view a religion that is not her own as nonsensical. Such a view, 
however, does not preclude the belief from being religious in nature.54 
Conversely, simply claiming a belief as religious does not make it so.55 
Although a narrow definition of religion may exclude minority 
religions, a broad definition of religion may render the protection 
meaningless.56 Protection of such an extensive array of beliefs, religious 
or nonreligious, may weaken the safeguard sought in the enactment of the 
                                                                                                             
 46. United States v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). 
 47. 32 C.F.R. § 75.3 (eliminated in 2007); see 72 Fed. Reg. 33677-01 (2007). 
 48. Donovan, supra note 33 (“‘[R]eligion’ and ‘religious’ are words which 
appear in 574 sections of the United States Code and 1,490 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. These legislative and administrative references are interpretable only 
if the category of ‘religion’ is appropriately and adequately defined.”). 
 49. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. 
 50. Usman, supra note 13. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184–85 (1965) (quoting United 
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)). 
 54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Usman, supra note 13. 
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legislation.57 Rather, the proper task for courts is to “decide whether the 
beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, 
in his own scheme of things, religious.”58 An inquiring court must place a 
greater emphasis upon determining whether a belief is sincere in order to 
limit examination regarding what constitutes religion.59 
B. United States Supreme Court Development of “Religious Practice” 
Standard  
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to define religion in the 
application of legislation60 involving religion.61 In two pivotal Supreme 
Court cases, United States v. Seeger and Welsh v. United States, the Court 
held that beliefs in “parallel” positions to the position of God are worthy 
of protection.62 Even if a claimant considers the belief non-religious, the 
Court may protect the belief if the party holds it with the strength of 
traditional religious views.63 The Court’s examination of religious beliefs 
arose when men sought exemption from participation in military service64 
pursuant to Universal Military Training and Service Act (“UMTSA”).65 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185. 
 59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2012) (“Religious Freedom Restoration Act” or 
“RFRA”); 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958) (Universal Military Training and Service 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 62. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. The Court described its “parallel positions” test in 
the following manner: 
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by 
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the 
statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an 
intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding 
others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of 
equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their 
religious tenets. 
Id. at 176. 
 63. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163 (showing the 
development of this standard); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970). 
 64. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185; Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 
(9th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 65. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).  
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The Court now uses the standard developed in Seeger and Welsh in Title 
VII cases to determine whether a belief is religious.66  
The Court first considered whether it should give conscientious 
objectors67 the same protection as religious objectors in United States v. 
Seeger.68 In Seeger, the Court heard a consolidated set of claims from 
conscientious objectors who were opposed to any form of war and refused 
to submit to induction into the armed forces.69 In explaining his reasoning, 
the first objector claimed an ethical belief in intellectual moral integrity, 
citing Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza.70 The second objector claimed a belief 
in a “Supreme Reality,” in which his most important principle held that no 
man sacrifice another man’s life.71 The third objector claimed that it was 
a violation of his moral code to take human life.72 Further, the third 
objector considered his moral code greater than his obligation to the state 
but asserted that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization.73 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. Claire Marblestone, A Matter of Conscience: United States v. Seeger and 
the Supreme Court’s Historical Failure to Define Conscientious Objector Status 
Under the First Amendment, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 201, 231 (2010) 
(explaining that conscientious objections date back to the framers’ debates during 
the ratification process of the United States Constitution; “rights of conscience” 
were considered part of religious freedom by the framers themselves). 
 68. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166–69. The constitutionality of a section of the 
UMTSA, which defines “religious training and belief,” was challenged under the 
First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise clause. The conscientious 
objectors claimed that the section: (1) does not exempt nonreligious conscientious 
objectors; and (2) discriminates between forms of religious expression in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 164–65. 
 69. Id. at 166–69; see also How the Draft Has Changed Since Vietnam, 
SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/How-
The-Draft-Has-Changed-Since-Vietnam [https://perma.cc/4LCW-PKMX] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2019) (explaining that the military draft, as used in the Vietnam 
War, was reformed in 1971). Before the 1971 reform, men between the ages of 
18 and 26 were vulnerable to being drafted. During the Vietnam War, the draftee 
was not guaranteed the right to a personal appearance before his board to appeal 
his classification. Thus, decisions about whether a man was drafted were based 
on paperwork alone. Id. 
 70. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. 
 71. Id. at 168. 
 72. Id. at 169. 
 73. Id. 
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The conscientious objectors’ claims74 arose under the UMTSA,75 
which exempts persons from combatant training and service who are 
opposed to participation in war in any form because of the person’s 
“religious training and belief.”76 The definition of “religious training and 
belief” as used in the Act refers to an individual’s belief in relation to a 
“Supreme Being,” “involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation, but (not including) essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”77 The Supreme 
Court held that the test of belief in relation to a Supreme Being is “whether 
a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of 
its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”78 The 
Court noted that it could not distinguish between beliefs that relate to a 
Supreme Being and beliefs that do not when such beliefs have “parallel 
positions” in the lives of those claiming the religious belief.79 Ultimately, 
the objectors’ beliefs met the “parallel positions” criterion.80  
The Supreme Court expounded upon its “parallel positions” reasoning 
in Welsh v. United States.81 In Welsh, the plaintiff, Elliott Ashton Welsh, 
II—similar to the Seeger objectors—challenged his participation in the 
military draft82 because of his moral and ethical beliefs.83 Mr. Welsh 
explicitly denied any religious nature to his objection to the draft.84 Rather, 
Mr. Welsh claimed that history and sociology formed his objections.85 The 
plaintiff explained in a letter to the board reviewing his appeal: “I believe 
I mentioned taking of life as not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, 
I assumed [the Department of Justice hearing officer] was using the word 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 165. The three Seeger objectors asserted constitutional violations 
based on the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise clause, in which 
the objectors specifically referred to the lack of exemption for nonreligious 
conscientious objectors and discrimination between different forms of religious 
expression. Id. 
 75. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).  
 76. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164. 
 77. Id. at 165; 50 U.S.C. App. 456(j) (1958). 
 78. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 166. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970); Seeger, 380 U.S. at 
165–66. 
 82. How the Draft Has Changed Since Vietnam, supra note 69 (explaining that 
the military draft, as used in the Vietnam War, was reformed in 1971; before the 
1971 reform, men between the ages of 18 and 26 were vulnerable to being drafted). 
 83. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342. 
 84. Id. at 341. 
 85. Id. 
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‘religious’ in the conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest 
did not characterize my belief as ‘religious.’”86 Upon reconsideration, 
however, Mr. Welsh claimed that his beliefs were “religious in the ethical 
sense of the word.”87 Mr. Welsh thus admitted that he characterized his 
beliefs as ethical rather than religious.88 
Considering the ethical nature of the beliefs, the Court found that Mr. 
Welsh’s conscientious objections to war were “undeniably” based partly 
on perceptions of global politics.89 Although the UMTSA explicitly 
excluded objectors whose views were “essentially political, sociological, 
or philosophical” or based on “merely personal moral code,” the Court 
found that these exclusions did not “restrict the category of persons who 
are conscientious objectors by ‘religious training and belief.’”90 The Court 
determined Mr. Welsh to be a conscientious objector to the draft although 
he denied any “religious” aspect to his objection.91 In its decision, the 
Court recognized the lower court’s determination that Mr. Welsh held his 
beliefs “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions”92 and 
thus, met the qualifications to be exempted.93 The Court expanded 
protection of religious beliefs in Seeger and Welsh, offering protection to 
beliefs held with the strength of traditional religious convictions or beliefs 
in “parallel positions” to the orthodox belief in God, even if not religious 
in nature.94 In other words, a litigant’s belief does not need to stem from a 
classic or traditionally recognized religion so long as the belief mirrors in 
strength to one of the traditional religions.95 
C. Concerning Title VII: The Confusion in What Constitutes “Religion”  
The EEOC utilizes the standard the Supreme Court developed in 
Seeger96 and Welsh97 when determining which beliefs it protects pursuant 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 341–42. 
 87. Id. at 342. 
 88. Id. at 341–42. 
 89. Id. at 342. 
 90. Id. at 343. 
 91. Id. at 343–44. 
 92. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 398 
U.S. 333 (1970). 
 93. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44. 
 94. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965); Welsh, 404 F.2d 
at 1081, rev’d, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 95. See generally Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66; Welsh, 404 F.2d at 1081, rev’d, 
398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 96. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163. 
 97. Welsh, 404 F.2d at 1078, rev’d, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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to Title VII.98 Title VII99 outlaws discrimination in the workplace on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.100 Pursuant to Title 
VII, a court protects religious beliefs so long as the employee sincerely 
holds the beliefs and they conflict with an employment requirement.101 An 
employer must reasonably accommodate its employees’ religious 
observances unless an accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer’s business.102 The term “religion” includes “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s 
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”103 Finally, in order for 
an employee to succeed in a religious discrimination claim,104 the 
employee must show that she adheres to a religion Title VII protects.105 
Title VII lays out two broad prohibitions that bar discrimination 
against employees relating to specific aspects of employment.106 First, an 
employer may not refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual because of the individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, with respect to the following: (1) 
compensation; and (2) terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.107 
                                                                                                             
 98. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 99. Supra note 41. 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).  
 101. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 
131, 143 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018). 
 102. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 
515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008). In order for an employee to adequately show 
that her employer violated its duty to offer a reasonable accommodation, the 
employee must prove that she: (1) has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts 
with an employment requirement; (2) informed the employer of this belief; and 
(3) was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment 
requirement. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all 
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer’s business.”). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 104. Id. In order to prove discrimination, an employee must show: (1) 
disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact. Id. These are the only two causes of 
action under Title VII. Id. 
 105. Mroz, supra note 10. 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). 
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Second, an employer may not limit, segregate, or classify its employees or 
employment applicants based on the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive 
employment opportunities to an individual, or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee.108 
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Enforcement 
Power 
Title VII also created the EEOC to end workplace discrimination and 
ensure the promise of opportunity to all employees.109 Title VII expressly 
authorizes the EEOC to file suit on behalf of employees facing 
discrimination in the workplace.110 An aggrieved employee, a person filing 
on behalf of an aggrieved employee, or a member of the Commission may 
file charges with the EEOC.111 The EEOC then serves a notice of the 
charge on the employer and conducts an investigation.112 The EEOC will 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. 
 109. 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/history/index.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/VZE8-MSDY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 110. Id. See also Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https: 
//www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/W7GS-TVBP] (last visited Jan. 27, 
2019). The EEOC has the authority to investigate allegations of discrimination. 
Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will then seek to either: (1) 
settle the claim; or (2) file a lawsuit in order to protect both individual’s rights as 
well as the public interest. Id. See also An Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html 
[https://perma.cc /5C96-S4BQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (indicating that 
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 and empowered the EEOC to prevent 
unlawful employment practices); Milestones: 1972, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1972.html [https://perma.cc/ 
P8G9-ET8Y] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (explaining that the 1972 amendments 
to Title VII “are designed to give EEOC the authority to ‘back up’ its 
administrative findings and to increase the jurisdiction and reach of the agency”); 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (stating the enforcement provisions of Title VII); What You 
Can Expect After You File A Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/2KPL-K2RF] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (explaining that if the EEOC is not able to determine 
that the law was violated, it will send the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue which 
gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in court).  
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(b). 
 112. Id. 
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dismiss the charge if there is not reasonable cause113 to believe the charge 
sets out a violation of Title VII.114 If the Commission finds reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge alleges a Title VII violation, it may use 
informal methods such as conference, conciliation, or persuasion to end 
the alleged unlawful employment practice.115 If informal methods are 
ineffective, the EEOC may commence a civil action against the 
employer.116 Actions the EEOC brings highlight the struggle that 
Congress, the EEOC, and courts face in determining which religious 
beliefs or practices are deserving of Title VII protection.117  
2. Title VII Religious Observances or Practices 
In Title VII, Congress defines religion as “all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief.”118 The EEOC further defines 
                                                                                                             
 113. Definition of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/definitions.cfm [https://perma 
.cc/E5EJ-ND8J] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). The EEOC defined “reasonable 
cause” as the following: 
EEOC’s determination of reasonable cause to believe that discrimination 
occurred based upon evidence obtained in investigation. Reasonable 
cause determinations are generally followed by efforts to conciliate the 
discriminatory issues which gave rise to the initial charge. NOTE: Some 
reasonable cause findings are resolved through negotiated settlements, 
withdrawals with benefits, and other types of resolutions, which are not 
characterized as either successful or unsuccessful conciliations. 
Id. The EEOC defined “no reasonable cause” as the following: “EEOC’s 
determination of no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred 
based upon evidence obtained in investigation. The charging party may exercise 
the right to bring private court action.” Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(f)(1); Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge 
.cfm [https://perma.cc/LQY6-HWSB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). An employee 
can file a Charge of Discrimination, which is “a signed statement asserting that 
an employer, union or labor organization engaged in employment discrimination. 
It requests EEOC to take remedial action.” Id. The EEOC then notifies the 
employer of the charge, and interviews the employee. Id. A Charge of 
Discrimination must be filed with the EEOC before the employee may file a job 
discrimination lawsuit against her employer. Id. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017); United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).  
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
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religious practices119 to include “moral or ethical beliefs” regarding right 
and wrong that are “sincerely held” with the strength of traditional 
religious views.120 The EEOC Guidelines explicitly recognize that Title 
VII broadly defines religion.121 Religious beliefs, practices, and 
observances may be theistic or non-theistic and may include unique views 
that a few individuals hold or even one individual holds.122 The beliefs 
must be more than simply personal preference and sincerely held.123 There 
is no requirement that a particular religious group espouse the beliefs that 
an employee or prospective employee holds in order for Title VII to 
protect the belief.124 Furthermore, Title VII may protect a belief even if the 
religious group with which an individual identifies does not accept that 
particular belief.125 
The EEOC has explicitly recognized traditional religious groups—for 
example, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism.126 The 
EEOC Compliance Manual also recognizes that religion may include 
religious beliefs that are uncommon, new, not part of a formal church or 
sect, to which only a small number of people adhere, or that seem illogical 
or unreasonable to others.127 The EEOC, however, distinguishes political, 
social, or economic philosophies from religion altogether—Title VII does 
not protect such philosophies.128  
                                                                                                             
 119. “Religious practice” as used in the EEOC’s guidelines may include: (1) 
religious observances; and (2) religious practices. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(j). 
 120. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163 (showing the 
development of this standard); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341.  
 121. Compliance Manual, supra note 5 (“Religion is very broadly defined 
under Title VII.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
 125. Id.; see Welsh, U.S. at 343. In Welsh, the petitioner’s beliefs were 
religious in nature despite the fact that the church he attended did not adhere to 
his beliefs. Id.  
 126. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (citing Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. 
Va. 1973), aff’d, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Slater v. King Soopers, 809 F. Supp. 
809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992). See also Compliance Manual, supra note 5 (“For 
example, EEOC and courts have found that the Ku Klux Klan is not a religion within 
the meaning of Title VII because its philosophy has a narrow, temporal, and political 
character. In an analogous case, Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2002), the court held that an employee’s 
membership in the World Church of the Creator was a ‘religious’ belief, even 
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In addition to recognizing certain categories of religion, the EEOC 
provides examples regarding what constitutes religious observances or 
practices.129 Examples include the following: (1) prayer; (2) attendance of 
worship services; (3) use of religious garb, symbols, or religious objects; 
(4) adherence to certain dietary rules; (5) abstention from particular 
actions; or (6) proselytizing.130 The employee’s motive is central in the 
determination of whether a practice is religious; the activity itself is not 
determinative.131 As a result, courts determine the inquiry into whether a 
practice or observance is “religious” on a case-by-case basis.132 
II. SINCERELY HELD BELIEFS: HOW FAR SHOULD COURTS GO? 
As the definition of religion is expansive and ambiguous, a court can 
strike an advantageous balance by focusing its efforts on an inquiry 
regarding whether a belief is “sincere.”133 A factual inquiry into sincerity 
conducted on a case-by-case basis provides a less intrusive means of 
determining whether the belief is protected: by determining sincerity 
rather than validity of the belief itself.134 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Seeger: 
But we hasten to emphasize that while the “truth” of a belief is not 
open to question, there remains the significant question whether it 
is “truly held.” This is the threshold question of sincerity which 
must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact—
                                                                                                             
though the organization’s central tenet is white supremacy, because ‘it functions as 
religion in [plaintiff’s] life’ as evidenced by the fact that he has been a minister in it 
for more than three years, worked to put the church’s teachings into practice, and 
actively proselytizes. However, the Peterson court might have reached a different 
conclusion had it considered whether the belief was merely one-dimensional and 
thus not religious, i.e., not part of a moral or ethical belief system concerning 
‘ultimate ideas’ about ‘life, purpose, and death.’”) (citations omitted). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.; compare Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 
1998) (employer not liable for denying employee’s request to miss work to attend 
religious pilgrimage when the dates of the pilgrimage were merely personal 
preference), with Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (employer 
liable for failing to accommodate employee’s request to attend religious ceremony).  
 133. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017); see also Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, 
Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 59, 62 (2014). 
 134. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
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a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption 
as a conscientious objector.135 
The court must examine sincerity in each case to determine whether the 
belief is “truly held.”136 If the belief is not sincere, the court can dispose of 
the claim at the outset.137  
A. Marked by the Beast?: United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Consol Energy, Inc.138 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with 
determining sincerity of an employee’s belief when he feared receiving 
the “Mark of the Beast” in United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Consol Energy, Inc.139 In June 2017, the court held that 
Title VII protects religious beliefs so long as sufficient evidence indicates 
the employee’s beliefs are sincerely held and the beliefs conflict with an 
employment requirement.140 Consol Energy arose out of a coal miner’s 
religious objection to the use of a hand scanner out of fear of being marked 
by the “Mark of the Beast.”141 The Consol Energy employee, Beverly R. 
Butcher, Jr.,142 was a satisfactory employee of almost 40 years with no 
record of disciplinary issues or poor performance.143 Mr. Butcher was also 
a life-long evangelical Christian, ordained minister, and associate pastor.144 
Over a span of 37 years, Mr. Butcher never experienced a conflict between 
his employment at the coal mine and his religious beliefs.145 
In 2012, however, Consol Energy began using a biometric hand-
scanner system at the coal mine to check employees in and out of shifts.146 
Consol Energy required each employee to scan his right hand, which was 
then linked to the employee’s personnel number.147 The hand scan system 
provided for efficient reporting of the employee’s worked hours, as 
                                                                                                             
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
 138. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 
131 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 143. 
 141. Id. at 136–38. 
 142. Id. at 136. 
 143. Id. at 137. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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opposed to the shift foreman manually recording each shift.148 Mr. Butcher 
refused to scan his hand and raised a religious objection under the Bible’s 
Book of Revelation.149  
According to Mr. Butcher, if he scanned either of his hands, the 
Antichrist would mark him, which would condemn him to “everlasting 
punishment.”150 Mr. Butcher testified that his religious beliefs were based 
on “authenticity . . . [and] authority of the scriptures.”151 Furthermore, Mr. 
Butcher stated that he believed in an Antichrist that stood for “evil.”152 If 
Mr. Butcher received the “Mark of the Beast,” the Antichrist would have 
the ability to manipulate him, as he would be marked as a follower of the 
Antichrist.153 Thus, participation in the hand scanner would have presented 
a threat under his core religious beliefs.154  
As a result, Mr. Butcher spoke to his union representative regarding 
his concerns.155 Mr. Butcher’s union representative subsequently brought 
his concerns to Consol Energy’s Human Resources department.156 Consol 
Energy instructed Mr. Butcher to request a letter from his pastor 
explaining Mr. Butcher’s need for a religious accommodation.157 Mr. 
Butcher’s pastor did so, reiterating Mr. Butcher’s “deep dedication to the 
Lord Jesus Christ” in his letter.158 Mr. Butcher also wrote his own letter 
describing his perspective and reasoning why using the hand scanner 
system violated his religious beliefs.159  
At a meeting with his superiors, Mr. Butcher provided both his own 
letter and his pastor’s letter to the superintendent and Human Resources 
supervisor.160 The participants discussed Mr. Butcher’s motivation 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 137–38. 
 150. Id. (“Butcher’s understanding of the biblical Book of Revelation is that 
the Mark of the Beast brands followers of the Antichrist, allowing the Antichrist 
to manipulate them. And use of Consol’s hand-scanning system, Butcher feared, 
would result in being so ‘marked,’ for even without any physical or visible sign, 
his willingness to undergo the scan—whether with his right hand or his left—
could lead to his identification with the Antichrist.”). 
 151. Id. at 137. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 138. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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underlying his objection to the hand scanner system.161 Mr. Butcher 
explained that he could not and would not participate in the biometric 
scanner system but suggested that he check in with the shift supervisor 
upon arrival and departure in lieu of scanning his hand, as had been prior 
practice at the coal mine.162 Nevertheless, Consol Energy resisted Mr. 
Butcher’s suggested accommodation.163 
The Human Resources supervisor provided Mr. Butcher with a letter 
from the manufacturer of the hand scanner, ensuring Mr. Butcher that he 
would not receive any sort of mark from the hand scanner.164 In the letter, 
the manufacturer explained its own interpretation of the Scriptures: that 
the “Mark of the Beast” is associated only with the forehead or the right 
hand.165 The manufacturer specifically referred to Revelation 13:16, which 
states: “He forced everyone, small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, 
to receive a mark on his right hand or on his forehead.”166 Using Scripture, 
the manufacturer sought to distinguish the left hand as impervious to the 
“Mark of the Beast.”167  
Consol Energy further claimed that the option to scan the left hand 
was an accommodation because it precluded the imposition of the “Mark 
of the Beast” as Revelation 13:16 describes.168 After Consol Energy gave 
Mr. Butcher the manufacturer’s letter, the Human Resources supervisor 
requested that Mr. Butcher discuss the information with his pastor.169 
Finally, if Mr. Butcher continued to object, the Human Resources 
supervisor requested that Mr. Butcher write a letter describing his church’s 
disapproval of the hand scanner.170 
Unbeknownst to Mr. Butcher, Consol Energy offered accommodations 
to employees with hand injuries but simultaneously denied an 
accommodation to Mr. Butcher, a religious objector.171 Other employees at 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 139. 
 164. Id. at 138. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Reply Brief of Appellants and Response Brief as Cross-Appellees, U.S. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy Inc., 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16-1230, 16-1406), 2016 WL 4501896 at *3. 
 167. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
 168. Reply Brief of Appellants and Response Brief as Cross-Appellees, U.S. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy Inc., 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16-1230, 16-1406), 2016 WL 4501896 at *3. 
 169. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 138. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 139. 
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the coal mine were permitted to use a punch code to enter their personnel 
numbers rather than scan their hands because of hand injuries.172 Therefore, 
it would have been cost-free for Consol Energy to allow Mr. Butcher to enter 
his personnel number on a keypad instead of scanning his hand.173 Consol 
Energy, however, sent an email in which it authorized the keypad 
accommodation for two injured employees and denied Mr. Butcher’s 
religious objection.174 In the email, Consol Energy wrote: “[L]et’s make our 
religious objector use his left hand.”175 
When Mr. Butcher refused to use the hand scanner system, Consol 
Energy presented Mr. Butcher with the company’s disciplinary procedures 
in which: (1) the first and second missed scans would lead to a written 
warning; (2) the third missed scan would result in a suspension; and (3) 
the fourth missed scan would result in suspension with intent to 
discharge.176 Mr. Butcher thus felt that Consol Energy’s intent was to fire 
him if he did not scan his hand.177 Consequently, after much discussion 
between Consol Energy and Mr. Butcher, the employee felt that he had no 
choice but to retire under protest from his employment at the coal mine.178  
The EEOC brought an enforcement action against Consol Energy on 
Mr. Butcher’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
West Virginia.179 A jury decided in favor of Mr. Butcher; Consol timely 
appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case.180 The EEOC alleged 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. at 138. 
 173. Id. at 139. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 139–41; U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, 
Inc., 151 F. Supp. 3d 699 (N.D. W. Va. 2015), aff’d, 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 180. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 139–41. In Consol Energy, which was 
tried before a jury in January of 2015, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
EEOC. Id. The jury found that: (1) Mr. Butcher had sincere religious beliefs in 
conflict with Consol Energy’s requirement that he use the hand scanner; (2) Mr. 
Butcher informed Consol Energy of the conflict; and (3) Consol Energy 
constructively discharged Mr. Butcher for his refusal to participate in the hand 
scanner system. Id. The jury awarded Mr. Butcher $150,000 before the calculation 
of lost wages. Id. Ultimately, the district court calculated back pay and lost 
benefits, and awarded Mr. Butcher $436,860.74. Id. In addition, the district court 
required the employer to provide training on religious accommodations and 
required the employer to cease his violations of Title VII in the future. Id. Consol 
Energy then filed three post-verdict motions the district court denied. Id. The 
motions included a: (1) “renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under 
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that Consol Energy violated Title VII because it failed to accommodate 
Mr. Butcher’s religious beliefs and constructively discharged Mr. 
Butcher.181 At trial, Consol Energy quoted the same Scripture Mr. Butcher 
used to demonstrate that the “Mark of the Beast” can be imprinted only on 
the right hand or forehead but cannot be imprinted on the left hand.182  
Consol Energy’s defense implied that Mr. Butcher misunderstood the 
Book of Revelation and the significance of the “Mark of the Beast.”183 
Consol Energy attempted to use the Book of Revelation to indicate that 
the “Mark of the Beast” can be imprinted only on the right hand.184 Consol 
Energy’s core defense was that it did not fail to reasonably accommodate 
Mr. Butcher’s religious beliefs because there was no conflict between Mr. 
Butcher’s religion and Consol Energy’s requirement that employees use 
the hand scanner.185 Finally, Consol Energy argued that although Mr. 
Butcher’s beliefs were sincere, no conflict existed because the employee 
was mistaken in his religious belief and practice.186 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, however, would not consider the 
allegedly “mistaken” nature of Mr. Butcher’s beliefs.187 In so doing, the 
Fourth Circuit held that it is neither for the employer, nor the court, to 
question the correctness of an employee’s beliefs or religious 
understandings.188 Once the “incorrectness” of Mr. Butcher’s belief was 
removed from the analysis, there was “very little left” in support of Consol 
Energy’s case.189 The Fourth Circuit held that it would protect the 
employee’s religious beliefs whether or not the employee’s pastor or the 
hand scanner manufacturer agreed with Mr. Butcher’s interpretation of the 
                                                                                                             
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”; (2) Rule 59 motion for new 
trial; and (3) “Rule 59 motion to amend the district court’s findings and 
conclusions on equitable remedies.” Id. From this decision, Consol Energy timely 
appealed. Id. The EEOC also filed a timely cross-appeal on the district court’s 
ruling regarding punitive damages. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit thus reviewed the case. Id. 
 181. Id. at 139; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-6 (2012). 
 182. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
 183. Id. at 143. 
 184. Id. at 142. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned 
that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious 
claim.”)). 
 189. Id. at 143. 
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Book of Revelation.190 The Fourth Circuit found that ample evidence 
existed from which a jury could determine that Mr. Butcher sincerely 
believed that participation in the hand scanner would result in the 
imposition of the “Mark of the Beast.”191 
B. Required to Engage in Extra-Marital Affairs?: McCrory v. Rapides 
Regional Medical Center192 
Although the Consol employee believed the beast would mark him by 
means of a hand scanner, two male hospital employees sought Title VII 
protection for their numerous sexual affairs with co-workers in McCrory 
v. Rapides Regional Medical Center.193 The Consol Energy court and the 
McCrory court conducted contrasting sincerity analyses, presenting a 
relevant comparison.194 In McCrory, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana did not classify the employees’ extra-marital 
affairs as a religious belief subject to Title VII protection.195 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion.196  
In McCrory, the employees were hospital workers who admitted to 
engaging in extra-marital affairs with as many co-workers as possible.197 
The employer was concerned about the disruptive effect of the affairs and, 
as a result, fired the employees.198 After being fired, the employees filed 
charges with the EEOC, claiming that their employer had unlawfully 
discriminated against them because of their Baptist religion.199 Additionally, 
the employees claimed that their extra-marital affairs conflicted with their 
supervisor’s religious beliefs, which forbade extra-marital affairs.200 The 
employees claimed that the employer: (1) discriminated against them 
because of their religious beliefs, which led to the Title VII claim; (2) 
imposed his own religious beliefs on plaintiffs, which violated the First 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 142–43. 
 191. Id. at 142. 
 192. McCrory v. Rapides Reg’l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. La. 1986), 
aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 193. Id. at 977. 
 194. Id.; Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
 195. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979. 
 196. McCrory, 801 F.2d 396. 
 197. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 977. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  
968 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
Amendment; and (3) interfered with their constitutional rights to privacy.201 
This Comment will focus on the discrimination claim. 
The district court explained that Title VII does not protect employees 
from their employer’s religious beliefs, but rather, prevents impositions on 
an employee’s religious beliefs.202 In McCrory, plaintiffs claimed to be 
discharged because their extra-marital affairs were in opposition to the 
employer’s religious beliefs.203 Finding that plaintiffs’ allegation did not 
align with Title VII, the court held that the employees’ claims “translate[d] 
into a cause of action under Title VII if, and only if, their belief in their 
right to commit adultery [was] a ‘religious belief’ subject to protection.”204  
The court found that the right to commit adultery was not a religious 
belief worthy of protection.205 As the McCrory employees adhered to the 
Baptist religion, the court recognized that the Baptist faith embraces the 
Bible and the Ten Commandments, one of which states: “Thou shall not 
commit adultery.”206 Under the reading of the Ten Commandments, the 
court found that it would be “more than absurd to find that the Baptist faith 
condones the commission of adultery.”207 Thus, the court held that 
“plaintiffs could not assert such a thing with even the slightest hint of 
sincerity.”208 EEOC’s Compliance Manual, however, states that an 
employee’s belief or practice may be religious under Title VII even if the 
religious group to which the employee belongs does not recognize the 
individual’s belief or practice.209 EEOC guidance further provides that an 
employer should not assume that an employee is insincere solely because 
some of her practices deviate from commonly followed tenets of her 
religion.210 The court did not seem to recognize the EEOC’s guidance.211 
Rather, using the same tools, the McCrory and Consol courts ruled in 
opposite manners.212  
                                                                                                             
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 979. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See generally McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 977. 
 212. Id. at 975; U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, 
Inc., 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018). 
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C. Comparison of Consol Energy and McCrory 
In Consol Energy, the Fourth Circuit held that the interpretation of 
Scripture was immaterial so long as the employee’s professed belief was 
sincerely held,213 but in McCrory, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision that 
used Scripture to find the employees’ beliefs insincere.214 Both courts 
considered Scripture to reach diametrically different conclusions.215 In 
McCrory, the court cited the Ten Commandments in the Bible, one of 
which states, “Thou shall not commit adultery.”216 As the Baptist faith 
adheres to the Bible, the court determined that it would be “absurd” to find 
that the Baptist religion condones extra-marital affairs.217 In Consol 
Energy, antithetically, the court dismissed Consol Energy’s attempt to use 
Scripture to indicate that the employee’s interpretation of Scripture was 
incorrect.218  
The Fourth Circuit explained in Consol Energy that it is neither an 
employer’s place nor a court’s place “to question the correctness or even 
the plausibility of [an employee’s] religious understandings.”219 Thus, 
although Scripture may have indicated the Consol Energy employee’s 
belief was “incorrect,” the Court would not consider such assertions and 
stated that the sincerity of the belief was of the utmost importance.220 In 
McCrory, the court similarly used the Scripture to which the plaintiff 
referred to show that the employee’s belief was, in fact, “incorrect,” and 
thus not worthy of protection, allowing Scripture to replace what should 
have been the court’s analysis of these particular employees’ sincerity 
towards their belief.221 The disparity in both the application of Scripture as 
well as the manner in which the court sought to determine sincerity reflects 
the uncertainty with which courts grapple when addressing claims 
centered on religious questions.222  
Courts need a uniform mechanism through which to assess sincerity, 
as Consol Energy and McCrory evince.223 If courts do not properly analyze 
sincerity, an employee is given the opportunity to claim nearly anything 
                                                                                                             
 213. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 143. 
 214. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979, aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 215. Id.; Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
 216. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979, aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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 218. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
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 221. McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979. 
 222. Id.; Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 142. 
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as a religious belief without bearing the burden of proving that her belief 
is sincere.224 Nonetheless, the court must impose the proper limits on its 
sincerity analysis to prevent the analysis from morphing into a decision 
rooted in the factfinder’s own ideas regarding what religion should be.225 
The court can strike a proper balance by conducting an inquiry into 
sincerity.226  
III. HOW TO CONDUCT A SINCERITY ANALYSIS 
A proper analysis of an employee’s sincerity in her belief is the best 
gatekeeper of fraudulent or frivolous claims.227 As the Second Circuit 
stated, “[A] sincerity analysis is necessary in order to differentiat[e] 
between those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that 
are animated by motives of deception and fraud.”228 A heightened sincerity 
analysis allows the court to dispose of insincere claims at the outset of the 
case without delving into whether the beliefs are religious.229 A sincerity 
analysis, however, is one of three prongs of analysis that an inquiring court 
should conduct: (1) whether the practice imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer’s business;230 (2) whether the belief is sincere;231 and (3) if the 
belief is, in fact, sincere and the practice stemming from the belief does 
                                                                                                             
 224. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981); 
Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 497–98. (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that, at 
trial, the employee bears the burden of proving that her belief is sincere); 
Compliance Manual, supra note 5 (noting that when an employee initially 
requests an accommodation from her employer, the employer may request that 
the employee provide additional information to indicate sincerity when 
circumstances cast doubt on the employee’s sincerity). 
 225. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985), 
aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 
(2d Cir. 1984); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 
430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981) (“This court has recently held that a sincerity analysis is 
necessary in order to “differentiat[e] between those beliefs that are held as a matter 
of conscience and those that are animated by motives of deception and fraud.”). 
 226. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017); see also Adams & Barmore, supra note 133. 
 227. See Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 482, aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 228. Id. at 481. 
 229. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 231. Id. 
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not impose an undue hardship, whether the observance, practice, or belief 
qualifies as religious within the meaning of Title VII.232  
If the practice stemming from the belief imposes an undue hardship 
on the employer’s business, the court will not require the employer to offer 
an accommodation.233 If the belief does not cause an undue hardship, the 
court should determine if the employee’s belief is sincere.234 If the belief 
is insincere, the claim is dismissed; Title VII does not protect insincere 
beliefs.235 Finally, if the belief is sincere and the practice does not cause 
an undue hardship, the court may be required to determine if the belief is 
of the kind that Title VII protects.236 Such a balancing test precludes a 
court from reaching the third prong of the inquiry, a rigorous analysis of 
whether the particular beliefs at issue are religious, which is the most 
difficult because of religion’s First Amendment protection,237 cultural 
significance,238 and because of the inadequate definition of religion 
itself.239  
A uniform sincerity analysis will result in consistent protection of 
religious beliefs, adding predictability for employers and employees.240 
The appropriate sincerity analysis has the dual purpose of permitting the 
court to dispense of insincere beliefs at the forefront, but preventing the 
court from determining whether a belief fits the definition of religion.241 
Such an analysis is crucial given Title VII’s requirement that employers 
reasonably accommodate religious beliefs and practices.242 Title VII “does 
                                                                                                             
 232. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 
(1965) (showing the development of this standard); Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333, 341 (1970). 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 234. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 
 235. See id. (“[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include 
moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held 
with the strength of traditional religious views.”). 
 236. See supra note 12. 
 237. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64 (1878). 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. See United States v. Seeger, 
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United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970). 
 239. Mroz, supra note 10 (“Although the courts have developed sophisticated 
rubrics to analyze each of the causes of action, the definition of the “religion” that 
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 240. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
 241. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985), 
aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 242. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015). 
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not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices—that they 
be treated no worse than other practices. Rather, it gives them favored 
treatment, affirmatively obligating employers.”243 Religion is subject to 
special treatment not only because of an employer’s affirmative obligation 
to protect religious beliefs, but also because of the cultural significance of 
religion, rooted in the Constitution.244 Thus, the judicial resolution of Title 
VII religious discrimination claims can be best handled through the court’s 
inquiry into the sincerity of the employee’s belief.245 It is “entirely 
appropriate, indeed necessary, for a court to engage in analysis of the 
sincerity—as opposed, of course, to the verity—of someone’s religious 
beliefs in the free exercise context, and the Title VII context.”246 All 
religious discrimination cases warrant a heightened sincerity assessment.247  
A. The Sincerity Analysis 
The purpose of a sincerity analysis is to determine the employee’s 
good faith in the expression of her religious belief.248 Rather than 
evaluating the objective accuracy of a religious observance or practice, a 
reviewing court must assess the sincerity of the claimed belief in order to 
determine if “there is evidence that the adherent materially gains by 
fraudulently hiding secular interests behind a veil of religious doctrine.”249 
To make a sincerity determination, the court must examine the employee’s 
motivation behind her claim for a reasonable accommodation.250 Such an 
examination requires intense fact-finding on a case-by-case basis.251  
For a sincerity analysis to be sufficient, the factfinder must have the 
ability to observe the demeanor of the employee—or the person claiming 
the belief—during both direct and cross-examination.252 If the court 
conducted merely a “cursory evaluation,” the court would risk a 
determination of sincerity based on the factfinder’s perception of what a 
religion should resemble,253 which the Supreme Court has specifically 
                                                                                                             
 243. Id. 
 244. Donovan, supra note 33. 
 245. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
 246. Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 481; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 
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 250. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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precluded.254 To avoid subjective determinations, the factfinder must have 
the ability to observe the employee himself.255 If the belief is sincere from 
the court’s examination, the court will protect the belief.256 
1. Burden on the Employee 
The plaintiff-employee must produce evidence that demonstrates her 
motivation behind the challenged practice, observance, or belief as 
religious in nature.257 Although the burden on the plaintiff to indicate her 
sincerity often goes “undisputed or [is] easily met,” the plaintiff’s burden 
is not absolved.258 The Fifth Circuit explained, “This is not an onerous or 
difficult task; testimony by the plaintiff describing her motivation in terms 
meeting the broad standard for what is ‘religious’ will usually suffice to 
survive summary judgment.”259 Although it is not a heavy burden, the 
plaintiff must put on evidence as to the sincerity of her belief.260 
2. Considerations to be Used to Determine Sincerity 
No single set of considerations will likely be sufficient to encompass 
the court’s examination in all sincerity analyses because of the vast array 
of beliefs. “The sincerity of a person’s religious belief is a question of fact 
unique to each case,” as it is primarily a question of employee 
motivation.261 Facts that the court may consider in weighing sincerity, 
however, may include evidence such as Human Resources reports or 
answers to deposition questions indicating that the employee consistently 
requested accommodations from the employer.262 The EEOC Guidelines 
on Religious Discrimination suggest evidence to consider in a dispute 
regarding a belief’s sincerity, including oral statements, affidavits, witness 
testimony, or other documents describing an employee’s beliefs and 
practices; when the employee embraced the belief; and when, where, and 
                                                                                                             
 254. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
 255. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. 
 256. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
 257. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 497 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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how the employee adhered to the belief or practice.263 Courts may consider 
such evidence in combination with the EEOC’s examples of religious 
observances or practices themselves, which include: (1) prayer; (2) 
attendance of worship services; (3) display of religious objects; (4) 
adherence to certain dietary rules; (5) proselytizing;264 (6) use of religious 
garb or symbols; and (7) nonparticipation in particular actions.265 A 
showing of sincerity, however, does not necessarily require strict doctrinal 
adherence to the standards of organized religious hierarchies.266 Although 
EEOC guidelines present a viable set of considerations, courts may find 
other factors useful when a plaintiff raises a unique belief.267  
Courts have attempted to determine sincerity in various situations.268 
One court held that a plaintiff could have sincere religious beliefs even 
though she did not follow all of the teachings of her religion.269 Another 
court found that a Muslim woman’s commitment to cover her whole body 
save her face and hands left “no doubt” as to the sincerity of her religious 
belief.270 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined an 
employee’s sincerity when he requested leave to return to his home 
country and perform certain rites at his father’s funeral.271 The court 
explained that a sincerity analysis did not require a deep inquiry of the 
employee’s reasons or motive for holding his beliefs, as such an inquiry 
would create a “slippery slope” that the court did not “desire to 
descend.”272 The Seventh Circuit found the employee’s belief sincere 
based on deposition testimony, noting that the employee’s willingness to 
                                                                                                             
 263. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 264. Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda 
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risk his job and put his car up as collateral for a loan to finance his trip to 
participate in burial rites was relevant evidence of sincerity.273 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found evidence showing 
that the employee acted contrary to tenets of his religion to be relevant when 
determining sincerity of an employee’s belief.274 The court noted the 
following facts, which it considered contrary to the employee’s professed 
religious belief: (1) the employee was divorced; (2) the employee took an 
oath before a notary; and (3) the employee worked five days a week as 
opposed to the six days required by his faith.275 Accordingly, the First 
Circuit found that an issue of fact precluded summary judgment, explaining 
that credibility determinations are to be made by the factfinder at trial.276  
3. Limits on Courts’ Inquiries 
Although a court may conduct an analysis to determine sincerity and 
dismiss insincere claims, an inquiring court is limited in its religious 
inquiry.277 The Supreme Court stated, “[I]t is not within the judicial 
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or 
[another practitioner] . . . more correctly perceived the commands of their 
common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”278 A 
court must conduct an inquiry into the sincerity of a person’s religious 
belief with a “light touch, or judicial shyness.”279 A court must conduct its 
sincerity analysis carefully because courts are forbidden to tread into the 
realm of religious inquiry.280 Religious inquiry presents a difficult task for 
courts because of the constraints of the First Amendment and courts’ own 
limiting principles.281 
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Courts are not to gauge the objective accuracy of a religious observance 
or practice.282 One court held that although the state may not assess the 
“objective accuracy” of a person’s beliefs, it may consider whether the 
beliefs are “sincerely held.”283 The preclusion of an assessment of objective 
accuracy contradicts the court’s holding in McCrory, which assessed the 
objective accuracy of whether the Baptist religion requires extra-marital 
affairs.284 The trouble lies in the fact that a “[s]incerity analysis is 
exceedingly amorphous, requiring the factfinder to delve into the 
claimant’s most veiled motivations and vigilantly separate the issue of 
sincerity from the factfinder’s perception of the religious nature of the 
claimant’s beliefs.”285 Courts must strike a delicate balance when 
conducting an analysis of a religious belief.286 
B. Separating the Sincerity Analysis from Whether the Belief is of the 
Kind Title VII Protects 
Resolution of a Title VII religious discrimination claim requires the 
inquiring court to separate the question of whether a belief is sincere from 
the question of whether the belief is of the kind Title VII protects.287 The 
two inquiries are inherently different, and a court eases its burden by 
limiting the number of cases that charge the court with the constitutionally 
challenging task of determining what constitutes religion.288 In showing 
that a belief is of the kind Title VII protects, a plaintiff must assert that her 
belief is not merely a personal preference.289 Simply because the plaintiff 
claims a personal preference as a “personal religious creed” does not, in 
fact, make the activity religious.290 Rather, the plaintiff must hold the 
belief with the strength of traditional religious views291 or in a “parallel 
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position” to an orthodox belief in God.292 The Third Circuit acknowledged 
the difficulty in determining whether “a particular set of ideas constitutes 
a religion” and explained that “this task is particularly difficult when we 
have to determine whether a nontraditional faith requires the protection of 
the First Amendment and/or of Title VII.”293 
The Third Circuit adopted a contemporary definition of religion to use 
when determining whether the belief is a religion Title VII protects.294 The 
definition is as follows:  
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions 
having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a 
religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system 
as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be 
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.295  
The Third Circuit’s definition excludes isolated moral teachings that are 
not a set of comprehensive beliefs regarding “fundamental or ultimate 
matters.”296 Finally, the third factor of formal and external signs are 
signified by acts such as “formal services, ceremonial functions, the 
existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, 
observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with 
the traditional religions.”297 
This third factor appears similar to other factors that courts may use to 
assess sincerity.298 Courts, however, must separate the two analyses. 
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Courts must first analyze sincerity, using the factors listed above.299 A 
court’s last step is to determine whether the belief is the kind of religion 
provided for in Title VII, and should analyze the factors the Third Circuit 
used.300 Only after a court determines that a reasonable accommodation 
does not impose an undue hardship and that the belief is sincere may the 
court make the final determination involving the religious nature of the 
belief.301 By using similar factors at the outset in a sincerity analysis, 
courts avoid the problematic burden of defining religion,302 reducing a risk 
of violating its own limiting principles303 and the constraints of the First 
Amendment.304  
C. Heightened Sincerity Analysis Standard Applied to McCrory and 
Consol Energy  
The holdings of Consol Energy and McCrory may be reexamined in 
the context of the proper sincerity analysis.305 The Fourth Circuit’s holding 
in Consol Energy would likely be the same: Mr. Butcher sincerely held his 
belief.306 In conducting its sincerity analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined 
many facts that favored a finding of sincerity.307 First, the court referred to 
Mr. Butcher’s meetings with his union representative in which he made his 
                                                                                                             
practice, as well as when, where, and how the employee adhered to the belief or 
practice. Id. The EEOC also suggested that an EEOC investigator hear evidence 
from witnesses the employee identifies with knowledge of whether the employee 
adheres to the belief or practice. Id. Examples of religious practices or 
observances include prayer, attendance of worship services, display of religious 
objects, adherence to certain dietary rules, proselytizing, use of religious garb or 
symbols, and nonparticipation in particular actions. Id.; see supra text 
accompanying note 258. 
 299. Compliance Manual, supra note 5; see supra text accompanying notes 
254–60.  
 300. Fallon, 877 F.3d at 492. 
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 224–27. 
 302. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). Title VII itself broadly defines “religion” to 
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Id. 
See also supra note 12. 
 303. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 304. See supra Part I.A. 
 305. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 
131 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018); McCrory v. 
Rapides Reg’l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. La. 1986), aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 
(5th Cir. 1986). 
 306. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d at 143. 
 307. Id. at 138. 
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concerns known.308 Second, the court examined Mr. Butcher’s meetings 
with his Human Resources supervisor and coal mine superintendent, in 
which he requested an accommodation.309 Third, the court referred to both 
Mr. Butcher’s letter and Mr. Butcher’s pastor’s letter to the employer, in 
which both individuals described the reasoning and motivation for Mr. 
Butcher’s religious belief.310 Fourth, Mr. Butcher requested and suggested 
a feasible, cost-free alternative to the hand scanner system.311 Finally, the 
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Mr. Butcher retired under protest after 
many discussions with his employer regarding Mr. Butcher’s religious 
objections, seeming to dispel any idea of ulterior motivations.312 The 
Fourth Circuit then removed any implication of the scriptural 
“incorrectness” of Mr. Butcher’s belief from its analysis, which left little 
in favor of the employer.313 As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that 
sufficient evidence indicated the sincerity of Mr. Butcher’s belief.314 The 
facts that the court examined in Consol Energy can be distilled into the 
following objective factors: (1) proactivity of the employee in requesting 
an accommodation and voicing concerns; (2) ability to corroborate 
sincerity with other members of the religion; (3) willingness to participate 
in an alternative solution; and (4) resistance to quitting the job.315 The court 
adequately conducted a fact-specific sincerity analysis.  
In McCrory, however, the district court found and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed that the McCrory employees’ beliefs could not be sincere because 
of their conflict with Scripture.316 As opposed to Consol Energy, the court 
looked at few facts to assess sincerity.317 The court merely introduced the 
Ten Commandments—namely, “Thou shall not commit adultery”—in 
order to indicate that the McCrory employees’ beliefs could not be sincere 
when the belief contradicted Scripture.318  
                                                                                                             
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 143. 
 313. Id. at 139. 
 314. Id. at 142. 
 315. See generally id. at 138–43. 
 316. McCrory v. Rapides Reg’l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. La. 
1986), aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 317. Id. at 977–79. 
 318. Id. at 979. 
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Rather than affirming the decision without opinion, the Fifth Circuit 
should have conducted a true sincerity analysis.319 In so doing, the court 
could have examined the employees’ testimony itself, subjecting the 
employees to both direct and cross-examination.320 The court could have 
then probed the employees’ true motive321 in the employees’ extra-marital 
affairs: whether it was truly a sincerely held belief, or whether the 
employees claimed religious belief to veil the extra-marital affairs in 
religious doctrine, subjecting them to Title VII protection.322 Notably, the 
fact-intensive nature of the sincerity analysis may preclude summary 
judgment. 
The court would have been apt to assess the employees’ oral 
statements, affidavits, or other documents describing their beliefs and 
practices.323 While not dispositive, the court could have considered factors 
suggested by the EEOC, such as whether the employees requested a 
desirable accommodation for secular reasons; whether the employer had 
reason to believe that the purpose of the accommodation was not religious; 
or whether the employees behaved inconsistently with their professed 
belief.324 In addition, the court could have determined whether the affairs 
had to be carried out in this manner, and at this time, or whether the affairs 
were merely a personal preference.325 Finally, the court could have 
determined if the employees requested prior accommodation.326 Although 
the factors listed are not exhaustive, the factors will certainly aid the court 
in its determination of sincerity—a safer inquiry than into the religious 
inquiry itself.327  
As the EEOC Guidelines explain, an employee’s belief may constitute 
a religious belief regardless of whether the religious group with which an 
individual identifies accepts the belief.328 Thus, even though the Baptist 
religion does not condone the commission of adultery, as the McCrory 
court stated, a belief in affairs may still constitute the employees’ beliefs 
                                                                                                             
 319. See id.; see also Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965). 
 320. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157.  
 321. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 322. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985), 
aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 323. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998); see 
also Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 326. Kahn & Brown, supra note 262. 
 327. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
 328. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
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if the beliefs are sincerely held, do not cause an undue hardship, and are 
considered a religious belief or practice under Title VII.329 The McCrory 
court’s analysis is more akin to an examination of whether a belief is 
religious, an area in which the court is “forbidden to tread,”330 as it equated 
a lack of sincerity with the “incorrectness” of the belief.331  
If the court had conducted a proper sincerity analysis by hearing 
testimony from the employees,332 conducting direct and cross-
examinations,333 and assessing the suggested factors,334 then the court could 
have properly determined if the beliefs were sincere.335 If the beliefs were 
not sincere, then the court would have been correct in refusing to extend 
Title VII protection to the beliefs.336 A proper sincerity analysis ultimately 
protects an employee’s religious beliefs, protects the employer’s interests, 
aids the court, and safeguards the First Amendment.337 
D. Bringing It All Together: Properly Conducted Sincerity Analysis 
In practice, a court could conduct a proper sincerity analysis, easing 
its own burden, and ensuring protection to both the employee and 
employer in the following manner. First, the court must determine whether 
the employee’s practice or belief imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer.338 If the accommodation constitutes an undue hardship, the 
employer does not have to accommodate the employee’s belief.339 If the 
employer is not required to accommodate the employee’s religious belief 
or practice, then the court may dismiss the claim.340 The undue hardship 
inquiry is likely the most objective, allowing the court to dispose of claims 
that Title VII does not protect at the outset.341 If the court finds, however, 
                                                                                                             
 329. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 330. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Tagore 
v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 331. McCrory v. Rapides Reg’l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 979 (W.D. La. 
1986), aff’d, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 332. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 335. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. 
 336. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017). 
 337. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); Patrick, 745 F.2d 
at 157. 
 338. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id.  
 341. See generally id.  
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that the requested accommodation does not impose an undue hardship on 
the employer, the court may proceed to the second phase of the inquiry.  
Second, the court must determine whether an employee’s belief is 
sincerely held.342 To determine sincerity, a court is not limited to any one 
set of factors, as each case is fact-specific depending on the belief at 
issue.343 Suggestions for the court to consider, however, include: (1) 
proactivity of the employee in requesting an accommodation and voicing 
concerns; (2) ability to corroborate sincerity with other members of the 
religion; (3) willingness to participate in an alternative solution; and (4) 
resistance to quitting the job.344 In considering such factors, the court may 
consider the following evidence: oral statements, affidavits, witness 
testimony, or other documents describing an employee’s beliefs and 
practices; when the employee embraced the belief; and when, where, and 
how the employee adhered to the belief or practice.345 After conducting its 
sincerity analysis, if the court determines that the belief is sincere, then it 
may proceed, carefully, to the third phase of the inquiry.  
Finally, the court must determine whether the belief is of the kind that 
Title VII protects.346 For Title VII to protect the employee’s religious 
belief or practice, the employee must hold the belief with the strength of 
traditional religious views347 or in a “parallel position” to an orthodox 
belief in God.348 To aid the court in this difficult inquiry, the court can use 
the test articulated by the Third Circuit: (1) does the religious belief or 
practice address a fundamental and ultimate question regarding deep and 
imponderable matters?; (2) is the religious belief or practice 
comprehensive in nature, meaning that it is part of a broader belief-system 
as opposed to an isolated teaching?; and (3) is the religious belief or 
practice part of a larger religion that can be recognized by the presence of 
certain formal and external signs?349 Examples of formal and external 
signs of religion include formal services, ceremonial functions, the 
                                                                                                             
 342. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
 343. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 344. See generally U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 
860 F.3d 131, 138–43 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018). 
 345. Compliance Manual, supra note 5. 
 346. See Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
 347. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2017) (“But we hasten to emphasize that while 
the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question 
whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must 
be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact.”). 
 348. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). 
 349. Fallon, 877 F.3d 487, 4901. 
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existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, 
observation of holidays, and other similar manifestations associated with 
traditional religions.350 The inquiry is strictly limited by the First 
Amendment, requiring a wall between church and state,351 and the court’s 
principles, which prevents courts from determining the verity of beliefs.352  
The first two phases of the inquiry will limit the instances in which a 
court must determine whether a belief is religious in nature, which too 
easily strays into a determination of a religious belief or practice’s 
accuracy.353 Thus, a sincerity analysis protects the court from delving into 
scriptural interpretation, religious inquiry, and from the determination of 
what constitutes religion. 
CONCLUSION 
 A heightened sincerity analysis ensures that a court does not delve too 
deeply into the “correctness” or “incorrectness” of a religious belief.354 
Such a sincerity analysis focuses on the individual at hand, seeking to 
determine if the individual truly believes what she claims.355 A heightened 
sincerity analysis affords an employee the opportunity to indicate the 
sincerity of her belief, and thus, receive protection of her sincerely held 
belief.356 Likewise, employers are protected from safeguarding secular or 
personal beliefs merely veiled in religious doctrine.357 Finally, an inquiring 
court can refrain from straying where it is forbidden: intrusive religious 
inquiry.358 As such, the appropriate sincerity analysis is less likely to run 
afoul of the First Amendment.359 A court can strike a balance that is 
                                                                                                             
 350. Id. at 492; see supra text accompanying note 258. 
 351. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 352. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), 
aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 
86 (1944); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 353. See generally Burns v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 166 F. Supp. 2d 
881, 889 (S.D.N.Y 2001). 
 354. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 
131, 142 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 976 (2018) (citing Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) 
(“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not 
presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.”)). 
 355. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 356. Id. at 497–98. 
 357. Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 482, aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 358. Davis, 765 F.3d at 486 (citing Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 
(5th Cir. 2013)). 
 359. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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effective and beneficial for itself, the employee, and the employer by 
ensuring the protection of an employee’s sincerely held beliefs,360 
precluding an employer from protecting counterfeit beliefs,361 and 
preventing the court itself from crossing its boundary into determining 
verity of beliefs when determining if a belief fits the definition of 
“religion.”362 
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